

January 2006

Justice for Latin America on IDB Debts

The Case for Cancelling Inter-American Development Bank Debt NOW!

Summary

In 2005, following significant public pressure, the G8 announced a plan to cancel US\$40bn in debt of 18 of some of the world's most impoverished nations. 14 African nations and 4 Latin American nations will, in 2006, benefit from the cancellation of debts owed to the World Bank, IMF and African Development Fund (AfDF). While the deal does not go nearly far enough it is significant that for the first time the international community has acknowledged that 100% cancellation of some multilateral debts is urgently needed and can be accomplished.

While several African countries included in this initiative will receive a major debt cancellation, no country will receive the claimed full 100% debt cancellation. In Africa, the picture is mixed: Burkina Faso and Uganda will have the biggest proportion of their debt cancelled with up to 90%. Mozambique on the other hand will receive around a 40% debt cancellation. In Latin America however, the picture is gloomier.

For the four Latin American countries considered heavily indebted the amount written down will be 30% on averageⁱ, meaning that there are several important gaps in official plans. Among these gaps are that impoverished Latin American countries will continue to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in debt service to the Inter American Development Bank. It is inequitable and illogical that some countries should benefit more than others within the same official initiative, and **we are**

calling for the initiative to be extended to the Inter-American Development Bank by the time of its annual meeting in April 2006.

Background

In 2005, eyes were turned towards Africa as the continent most blighted by unacceptably high levels of poverty and underdevelopment. It is true that overall, Sub-Saharan Africa is the region furthest off-track towards meeting the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals. The UK's 2005 Africa Commission report describes how, on current trajectories, the goals for halving poverty, universal primary education and the elimination of avoidable infant deaths will not be delivered in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2015 but between 100 and 150 years late.ⁱⁱ

Nevertheless, many Latin American nations also face similar, huge challenges. Only 4 countries on the continent have been formally classified as HIPCsⁱⁱⁱ but Latin American HIPC and non-HIPC countries alike are struggling with very high levels of poverty, gross income inequalities and unsustainable debt ratios. Debts owed by Latin American nations to the **Inter-American Development Bank**, among other regional multilateral creditors such as the **Central American Bank for Economic Integration** and the **Caribbean Development Bank** were *not* however included in 2005's multilateral debt deal.

This short paper sets out why debt campaigners across Latin America, North America and Europe believe that the G8 multilateral debt deal should – and can easily and immediately – be extended to debts owed by the **4 Latin American HIPCs to the Inter-American Development Bank** (IDB). As this paper shows, debts owed to the IDB represent a **significant share** of Latin American HIPC and non-HIPCs' external debt burden and the debt service a huge drain on scarce government resources.

As civil society campaigners, we believe very strongly that IDB debt cancellation should be extended to **all those Latin American nations that need it in order to reach the MDGs** by the internationally agreed target-date of 2015. IDB debt cancellation for the 4 Latin American HIPCs should therefore only be seen as the **first step** in the right direction. But we believe the international community cannot justify denying **immediate** IDB relief to the 4 Latin American HIPCs. These countries have been acknowledged by the international community to have similar levels of unpayable debts as the African countries. The IDB also participated in the HIPC Initiative delivering US\$439mn in debt relief to the 4 Latin American HIPCs that have passed through the process^{iv}. It is inconsistent, unfair and wrong for the 2005 multilateral debt deal to have **included** the African Development Fund but **excluded** the IDB.

We therefore call on donors to extend the multilateral debt relief initiative to the IDB **without delay** and at the same time urge them, **in equal partnership with civil society and the governments concerned**, to open dialogue and start the planning process NOW on IDB debt cancellation for all those Latin American nations that desperately need it to reach the MDGs. But as this paper also reveals, much of this debt is in fact **odious or illegitimate** in nature and should not be repaid on the grounds of fundamental justice.

Inter-American Bank Debt Cancellation: Why It Matters for the 4 HIPCs

For the 4 Latin American HIPCs, the net gain from the G8 multilateral debt deal is much lower than the 14 African HIPCs because the Inter-American Development Bank was **excluded** where the African Development Fund was **included**. As an example, in Ghana, debts owed to IDA, IMF and AfDF represent around 90% of the country's external debt burden.^v For them, this deal is therefore significant. But in the case of the Latin American HIPCs, the G8 debt deal will mean an average external debt reduction of less than 30%^{vi}.

The external debt burden of the 4 Latin American HIPCs stands at about US\$15bn. The G8 debt deal will cancel about US\$4.5bn of this^{vii}.

So what do the 4 Latin American HIPCs owe the IDB and what is the impact of this debt burden on these countries? A quick look at the facts reveals the urgency of IDB debt cancellation.

Bolivia owes US\$1.6bn to the Inter-American Development Bank. This represents approximately 32% of the country's public and publicly guaranteed external debt burden.^{viii} Average annual debt service to the IDB over the last five years amounted to US\$97mn, which represents almost 37% of debt service payments. In 2004, Bolivia paid a total of US\$44mn in debt service to the World Bank (IDA) and IMF combined, whereas debt service to IDB amounted to a staggering US\$108mn. IDB debt cancellation for Bolivia would reduce the country's external debt burden by one third. This combined with the G8 multilateral debt deal would reduce the burden by approximately 70%. The combined impact on debt service would come close to 60%.^{ix}

Bolivia is South America's poorest nation. 63% of Bolivia's population lives below the poverty line. In 2004 the country paid out over US\$800mn in debt service payments – on both domestic and external debt – while during the same year it was able to invest only US\$750mn on the pro-poor expenditures of health and education COMBINED.^x Overall, public debt service represents a massive 35% of government revenue.^{xi}

At end-2005, **Guyana** had a total outstanding debt stock of US\$521.3mn to the IDB out of a total public and publicly guaranteed external debt stock of US\$1.22bn at end-2003 ^{xii}. The Inter-American Development Bank is in fact Guyana's largest creditor and, according to our calculations, debt service to the institution will represent a massive 64.6% of total external debt service obligations this year (see figure below).

In 2005, Guyana spent US\$25.1mn on debt service payments and will, on average, *every year* spend this same amount on debt service to the IDB over the next ten years.^{xiii} According to the World Bank, while poverty levels stand at around 35% country-wide, an alarming 92 percent of the population in rural areas – including many indigenous populations – continue to live in poverty. This US\$25mn could clearly have been much better spent.

For **Honduras**, the G8 multilateral debt deal means that the country will see US\$1.34bn in IDA debt and US\$190mn in IMF debt wiped-off the books in 2006. But Honduras owes 27% of its external debt burden to the IDB. This amounts to over US\$1.41bn at end-2004^{xiv}. In 2006 alone, debt service payments to the IDB will

amount to over US\$80mn^{xv}. Total debt service in 2003 amounted to US\$363mn so clearly IDB debt-service is a significant part.^{xvi} Meanwhile, over 70% of Hondurans live below the poverty line and a staggering 81% do not have access to clean drinking water^{xvii}.

At end-2005, **Nicaragua** owed US\$1.4bn to the Inter-American Development Bank out of an overall public and publicly guaranteed debt stocks of US\$5.4bn at end-2004^{xviii}. According to our calculations, debt service to the IDB as a percentage of total external debt service in 2006 will amount to an amazing 59.5% (see figure below). In 2006, Nicaragua will pay over US\$60.1mn in debt service to the IDB climbing to over US\$76.1mn by 2010.xix According to the World Bank, 46% of Nicaraguans live in poverty and 25% in extreme poverty.

Figure 1

Country	Total debt stock US\$ (1)	IDB debt in US\$ (2)	IDB debt as a % external debt	Projected total external debt service (US\$ 2006) (3)	Projected debt service to IDB in 2006 in US\$ (4)	Debt service to IDB as a % of overall debt service in 2006
Bolivia	4.93bn	1.6bn	32%	344.6mn	127.1mn	36.9%
Guyana	1.22bn	521mn	42%	34.7mn	22.4mn	64.6%
Honduras	5.08bn	1.4bn	27%	144.5mn	80.1mn	55.4%
Nicaragua	5.4bn	1.4bn	26%	101mn	60.1mn	59.5%

Sources:

- 1. Public and publicly guaranteed debt stock at end-2004. Sources: Banco Central de Bolivia, Banco Central de Honduras and Banco Central de Nicaraqua. In the case of Guyana, figures have been taken from GDF 2005 and represent end-2003 data.
- 2. Inter-American Development Bank
- World Bank, HIPC Initiative "Status of Implementation", September 13 2005
 Inter-American Development Bank debt service projections

The IDB is a significant creditor in all four cases and IDB debt cancellation would clearly make a huge difference to scarce government budgets. Given these stark facts, we believe immediate IDB debt cancellation for these four countries is both essential and ethical. It is also achievable – both politically and financially. Over the next ten years, the 4 Latin American HIPCs are collectively scheduled to reimburse the IDB around US\$2.75bn.** This money would mean an awful lot to the countries concerned – and a significant amount of new investments – but not an awful lot to IDB donors or the IDB which could easily and collectively find this sum (below we outline how).

The HIPC/non-HIPC Divide in Latin America: Where's the Sense?

Overall Latin American economies have become increasingly vulnerable to macroeconomic instability and shocks following the imposition of policies of capital account liberalisation by the IMF and the World Bank. Between 1990 and 2003, economic instability increased dramatically: Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru and Venezuela all had lower per capita GDP in 2003 than they had in 1980.

Against this background of generalised economic vulnerability and lower incomes per capita, four countries have been classified as "HIPC" in Latin America. But as the following country cases indicate the HIPC/non-HIPC divide in Latin America is highly

arbitrary and misleading. Indeed, the case of **Haiti** shows very clearly how one minute a country can be OUT of the HIPC Initiative then IN, depending on shifting debt ratios and the mood of the international community.

Haiti was not included in the original list of HIPCs drawn up by creditors in 1996. This is despite the fact that Haiti is severely indebted and is by far the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. According to the World Bank, an estimated 76% of Haiti's 8 million people live in poverty and income inequality is among the highest in the world. Half the population live on less than 1US\$ per day and half is illiterate. Added to these critical concerns are rapid economic decline, shortage of water, electricity, employment, access to primary health care and education and deforestation. In 2005, the World Bank decided that Haiti was indeed a HIPC with debt-to-export ratios in the region of 194%^{xxi}. But probably the international community also recognised that Haiti's multilateral debts were also fundamentally uncollectible. Haiti could enter the HIPC Initiative process as soon as 2007 (which ultimately would lead to cancellation of Haiti's debts to the World Bank and IMF), but this brings with it a fresh set of concerns. Much of Haiti's debt to IDA could easily be classified as illegitimate. In March 2002, the World Bank in an independent evaluation of Bank assistance to Haiti from 1986 to 2001 concluded that "the development impact of IDA lending had been negligible". The Bank should take coresponsibility for these clear failures in development lending, not attempt to legitimise these debts via the HIPC Initiative. Haiti will also have to comply with the deeply damaging (not to mention unpopular) economic reform programme associated with the initiative. Moreover HIPC countries have taken on average seven years to reach completion point. Haiti needs immediate debt cancellation. And this debt cancellation must include the IDB. Haiti is expected to pay the IDB US\$28.6mn in 2006 climbing to almost US\$40mn by 2010.xxii

Meanwhile, neither Ecuador nor Peru have been classified as HIPCs. This is despite severe (and increasing) levels of debt, high levels of poverty, and extreme vulnerability to external shocks. Both countries are heavily indebted to the IDB, and both countries will require significant debt cancellation in order to reach the MDGs.

Ecuador has total debt stocks amounting to US\$16.8bn.^{xxiii} The country's heavy dependence on commodity exports (oil, banana, cocoa, coffee and shrimp), its high level of public debt, combined with the occurrence of natural disasters and frequent changes of government are all elements that make Ecuador extremely vulnerable to internal and external shocks. They also help to explain the country's poor levels of economic growth and the deterioration of social indicators experienced in the country over the last two decades. In the late 1990's levels of poverty actually increased from 34% to 56% of the population. Currently, 50% of children suffer from malnutrition (rising to 70% in the rural, predominantly indigenous "sierra") and 7 out of every 10 Ecuadorians do not have access to basic health-care^{xxiv}. Against this background, Ecuador paid-out a massive 47% of the government's budget on debtservice payments in 2003 (US\$2.16bn). In contrast, social investments amounted to just 9%^{xxv}. The Inter-American Development Bank is the country's largest creditor (18% of total foreign debt).^{xxvi} Outstanding debt to the IDB amounts to over US\$2bn at end-2004.^{xxvii} Ecuador will pay over US\$213mn in debt service to the IDB in 2006^{xxviii}.

In Peru, poverty levels hover at around 48-49% of the population. Total debt stocks amounted to a staggering US\$29.8bn at end-2003^{xxix}. Over the past decade, amongst multilateral institutions, the IDB has been the leading source of external

financing for Peru. By the end of 2001, the country's debt to the IDB stood at over US\$2.8bn, or 43% of its overall indebtedness to multilateral institutions and 14% of the country's public external debt.^{xxx} In 2006, debt service to the IDB is projected to be over US\$381mn rising to US\$430mn by 2010.^{xxxi} Peru suffered extreme weather unbalances with El Niño just a few years ago and remains vulnerable to similar future shocks. Peru's goal is to reduce extreme poverty from 24% in 2002 to 18% in 2006: IDB debt cancellation would clearly help in these efforts.^{xxxii}

Because of these clear inconsistencies coupled with an overwhelming need to invest in the social and physical infrastructure, we as debt campaigners believe a much fairer approach is **debt cancellation for all those countries that need it to reach the MDGs by 2015.** This would do away with the highly subjective HIPC/non-HIPC divide. We therefore call on the international community to **open immediate dialogue on broader IDB debt cancellation** as an integral part of any reasonable strategy that aims to help Latin American nations meet the MDGs by 2015.

At Least Some IDB Debt is Odious

At the same time, at least some IDB debt in the region is in fact odious in nature. According to international legal precedent, debts are considered "odious" when they are contracted **without the consent of the people and not spent in their interests and when the creditor is aware of this**.^{xxxiii}

In **Nicaragua** for example, the IDB lent US\$321.6mn to the Somoza family's military regimes between 1961 and 1979. The most notorious dictator was Anastasio Somoza Debayle whose regime between 1967 and 1979 was marked by political repression of media and opposition voices, deteriorating economic conditions and embezzlement of international aid funds. **Haiti** is another case in point. The IDB lent US\$290mn to the two repressive "Papa Doc" and "Baby Doc" Duvalier regimes. Meanwhile, in **Argentina,** the IDB lent US\$1.6bn to the military junta responsible for the death or disappearance of over 30,000 innocent people between 1976 and 1983. Yet all three countries have been compelled through the IDB and other international financial institutions to continue servicing this odious debt.^{xxxiv}

What we are calling for

As this paper shows very clearly, the debt crisis is far from over and has certainly not been solved with the G8 multilateral debt deal, despite official rhetoric to the contrary. Latin American nations will continue to fork-out vast (and increasing) sums of money to the IDB to the detriment of their populations. In some cases, this debt is also odious in nature. IDB debt cancellation is therefore the only right thing to do – from both a justice and ethics standpoint.

In this context, we call for:

- The immediate cancellation of debts owed to the IDB of Latin American HIPCs (currently Bolivia, Guyana, Honduras and Nicaragua). We believe the international community cannot justify denying this cancellation to these countries: they have all passed through the HIPC Initiative (the initiative agreed at multilateral level – with all its damaging economic conditionalities) plus the G8 multilateral debt deal *included* the African Development Fund but *excluded* the IDB. This amounts to **unfair treatment.**
- 2. There should be **no further conditions** attached to this cancellation and it must **respect the principle of additionality**. This debt cancellation must **not** be accompanied by a dollar for dollar reduction in fresh disbursements: this will amount to giving with one hand while taking away with the other. According to our calculations, **over the next ten years, the 4 Latin American HIPCs are collectively scheduled to reimburse the IDB around US\$2.75bn.**^{xxxv} This money would mean an awful lot to the countries concerned and a significant amount of new investments but not an awful lot to IDB donors or the IDB which could easily and collectively find this sum.
 - I. Donors should find their contributions to the cost **over and above their aid budgets**.
 - II. The IDB also has its own internal resources which could be drawn on without taking away future concessional resources from the poorest countries^{xxxvi}. The Bank generated an operating income of US\$862mn in 2004 and US\$1.1bn in 2003. In addition, the Bank basically holds a fully performing sovereign-guaranteed loan portfolio plus loan loss reserves of US\$199mn in 2004. The Bank could therefore also contribute to the financing of this cancellation.
- 3. IDB debt cancellation for the 4 Latin American HIPCs should only be seen as the first step in the right direction. We call on donors, **in equal partnership with civil society and the governments concerned**, to open dialogue and start the planning process on IDB debt cancellation for all those Latin American nations that need it to reach the MDGs. We also support the establishment of a fair and independent process to identify and cancel odious and illegitimate debts. Such a process could be convened under the auspices of the United Nations.

About the signatory organisations

Eurodad

EURODAD (European Network on Debt and Development) is a network of 50 nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) from 15 European countries working on issues related to debt, development finance and poverty reduction. The Eurodad network offers a platform for exploring issues, collecting intelligence and ideas, and undertaking collective advocacy. Eurodad's aims are to:

• Push for development policies that support pro-poor and democraticallydefined sustainable development strategies.

• Support the empowerment of Southern people to chart their own path towards development and ending poverty.

• Seek a lasting and sustainable solution to the debt crisis, appropriate development financing, and a stable international financial system conducive to development.

For further information in Europe, contact Gail Hurley, Eurodad. Email: <u>ghurley@eurodad.org</u> or see: <u>http://www.eurodad.org</u>

Latindadd

Latindadd brings together organisations and campaign groups in Latin America which promote the participation of civil soceity in:

- The questioning of the debt in relation to its role in economic policy-making and inequality
- The reduction of external debt in Latin America
- The fight against poverty
- The promotion of human development and human rights
- Advocacy on public policy.

The member of Latindadd include: Foro de Deuda Externa de Honduras; Cáritas Honduras; Grupo Incidencia Norte-Sur de Nicaragua; Cáritas Nicaragua; Centro de Derechos Económicos y Sociales de Ecuador; Jubileo Guayaquil-Ecuador; Jubileo Perú; CEAS-Perú- Fundación Jubileo Bolivia, Cáritas Brasil; CIASE de Colombia y la Campaña en deuda con los Derechos de Colombia.

For further information in Perú, contact Rómulo Torres of Jubileo Perú: <u>solidaridad@ceas.org.pe</u>

Observatorio de la Deuda en la Globalización

The « Observatorio de la Deuda en la Globalización » is a coordinated network of people and teams dedicated to activism and research. Research is centred around the problem of North-South relations and the promotion of indebtedness in communities within current processes of globalisation.

For further information in Spain, contact Iolanda Fresnillo:

Iolanda.fresnillo@debtwatch.org or see: http://www.debtwatch.org/cast/

Instituto de Estudios Nicaragüenses

The Institute for Nicaraguan Studies (IEN) is a non-profit NGO dedicated to academic research in Nicaragua and committed to good governance, peace, effective democracy, human rights and nacional policies that promote equality and social justice.

For further information in Nicaragua, contact Rodolfo Delgado Romero: <u>ien@ibw.com.ni</u> or see: <u>http://www.ibw.com.ni/~ien/</u>

Fundación Jubileo Bolivia

The Jubilee Foundation is an institution of the Bolivian and German Catholic Churches which delivers services to Bolivian civil society, from critical analysis and research into everyday realities to ethical, social and political training activities. Principal activities are centred on capacity building, promotion of public spaces for citizen participation and debate with relevant official actors, the promotion of new leaders and values which strengthen democracy and democratic reform and institutions in Bolivia.

For further information in Bolivia, contact Alfred Gugler or Katy Murillo: <u>huber@entelnet.bo</u> or see: <u>http://www.jubileobolivia.org</u>

CIDSE

CIDSE (International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity) is a coalition of 15 Catholic development agencies in Europe and North America which share a common vision on poverty eradication and social justice and a common strategy on development programmes, development education and advocacy. CIDSE's advocacy work covers trade and food security, resources for development, global governance, EU development policy, and security and development. **Find out more at:** <u>http://www.cidse.org</u>

Sin Duda, Sin Deuda

The "Without Doubt, Without Debt" Campaign in Spain brings together Cáritas, CONFER, Justicia y Paz, Redes y Manos Unidas to call for debt cancellation in order to help countries achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The campaign believes that no poor country can achieve the MDGs if rich countries do not fulfil their promises under Goal 8 (develop a global partnership for development). **For more information in Spain, contact María Villanueva, Manos Unidas:** <u>deuda@manosunidas.org</u> / <u>coord.deuda@manosunidas.org</u> or see:

http://www.sindudasindeuda.org

FUNDACIÓN SES

The SES Foundation (Sustainability, Education and Solidarity) in Argentina was created in 1999 and is dedicated to the promotion and development of strategies to promote social inclusion, education, economic and work opportunities for young people and youth at disadvantage.

For more information in Argentina, contact Alberto Croce: <u>dir@fundses.org.ar</u> or see: <u>http://www.fundses.org.ar</u>

Endnotes

ⁱ Latindadd calculations, Fundación Jubileo (Bolivia)

http://www.commissionforafrica.org/english/report/thereport/english/11-03-05_cr_report.pdf

- iii The 4 Latin American HIPCs are: Bolivia, Guyana, Honduras and Nicaragua.
- ^{iv} World Bank/IMF, "HIPC Initiative Status of implementation", August 2005, p. 14

^{vi} Fundación Jubileo (Bolivia), Nota de Información sobre la Condonación de la Deuda Externa, Diciembre 2005

^{vii} Fundación Jubileo (Bolivia), As above

viii Banco Central de Bolivia, Diciembre 2005. Bolivia had total public and publicly guaranteed debt stocks of over US\$4.93bn at end-2004

^{ix} Fundación Jubileo (Bolivia), As above

x Romper la cadena. La deuda pública de Bolivia, Fundación Jubileo (Bolivia), Noviembre 2005, p. 8

^{xi} As above, p. 3

xii IDB Country Strategy with Guyana, November 2002:

http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=423966 and Global Development Finance 2005. Reflects the stock write-off under HIPC I and HIPC II

xiii IDB debt service projections: http://www.iadb.org

xiv All figures from Situación Actual de la Deuda Externa y sus Perspectivas. Más allá de los procesos de condonación, FOSDEH 2005, p. 7 and p. 19. The country has total public and publicly guaranteed debt stocks of over US\$5.08bn at end-2004 (Banco Central de Honduras y Presidencia de la República, 2005)

xv IDB debt service projections: http://www.iadb.org

xvi Global Development Finance 2005

^{xvii} Situación Actual de la Deuda Externa y sus Perspectivas. Más allá de los procesos de condonación, FOSDEH 2005, p. 59. Total poverty expenditures for the same year amounted to US\$520.8mn but the covered ALL of the following COMBINED: education, health, water, sanitation, rural infrastructure and social safety projects (HIPC Initiative Status of Implementation, World Bank, September 13 2005 pp. 56-57). ^{xviii} Banco Central de Nicaragua: <u>http://www.bcn.gob.ni/estadisticas/externo/12.pdf</u>

xix IDB debt service projections: http://www.idb.org

xx Eurodad calculations based on IDB debt service projection data. See: http://www.iadb.org

xxi World Bank, HIPC Initiative "Status of Implementation", September 13 2005

xxii IDB debt service projections: http://www.iadb.org

xxiii Global Development Finance 2005

^{xxiv} All figures from Hugo Arias, La Sostenibilidad de la Deuda pública del Ecuador, Diciembre 2005, Jubileo 2000 Red Guayaquil

xxv As above

^{xxvi} Ecuador owes the World Bank 8% and the IMF 2.3% of its debt respectively. Ecuador's **total** outstanding debt burden stood at US\$16.8bn at end-2003 (GDF 2005) with public **external** debt at over US\$11bn (IDB). See IDB Country Strategy with Ecuador: <u>http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=447433</u> ^{xxvii} As above

xxviii IDB debt service projections: http://www.iadb.org

xxix Global Development Finance 2005

xxx IDB Country Strategy with Perú: http://www.iadb.org/regions/re3/pe/cppe02eng.pdf

xxxi IDB debt service projections: http://www.iadb.org

xxxii IDB Country Strategy with Perú: http://www.iadb.org/regions/re3/pe/cppe02eng.pdf

xxxiii The doctrine of odious debts was formalised in 1927 by Alexander Sack, a Russian international law scholar working in Paris

xxxiv See Jubilee USA, Fact Sheet: Latin America's Debt and the Inter-American Development Bank, January 2006: <u>http://www.jubileeusa.org/jubilee.cgi?path=/take_action&page=idbfactsheet06.html</u>

xxxv Eurodad calculations based on IDB debt service projection data. See: http://www.iadb.org

xxxvi IDB Annual Report 2004, Chapter on "Management's Discussion and Analysis, See: <u>http://www.iadb.org/EXR/ar2004/</u>

ⁱⁱ Africa Commission 2005, pp. 180:

^v Government of Ghana